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Abstract 
Nuclear forensics is a scientific discipline where signatures in nuclear and other radioactive material 
are investigated and evaluated in order to aid in criminal investigations concerning these materials. 
Examples of signatures that may be useful is the age and isotopic composition of the nuclear material 
and trace elements in the material. In order for evidence to hold up in court, the information extracted 
from forensic investigations need to be accurate and precise.  
This work shows some possibilities and limitations of using two common techniques for measurements 
of nuclear material and other radioactive material: gamma spectrometry and inductively coupled 
plasma - mass spectrometry. One part of this work is dedicated to the applicability of hand-held 
instruments. The categorization of uranium using low-resolution gamma spectrometry and possibility 
of using signatures in high activity 241Am sealed sources that can be obtained by HPGe were explored. 
In the other part, methods for high confidence measurements of lanthanides using ICP-MS were 
developed and problems arising when performing these analyses with as small uncertainties as 
possible were investigated.  
The results show that nuclear forensic analyses require deep understanding in the measurement 
process in order to provide accurate results. Low-resolution instruments in the current configuration 
have been shown to be a poor choice for categorization of uranium. On the other hand, there are a 
number of interesting signatures in 241Am-sources that can be provided by high-resolution gamma 
spectrometry. By using chemical separations or desolvating sample introduction systems in 
combination with careful data evaluation, it is possible to measure the lanthanide series without 
spectral interferences and with low uncertainties. By investing meticulous work to the analyses, it is 
possible to achieve measurements with high confidence. 
Keywords: Nuclear forensics, Uranium, Lanthanide patterns, 241Am, ICP-MS, gamma spectrometry 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
If a model is simple, it likely will be wrong, if it is complex, it surely is impractical. 
- Unknown 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear material has been under strong worldwide regulation for over 60 years. Ever since the first 
military use of fission was realised as a result of the Manhattan project, the implications of such a 
weapon have been feared. The safeguards organization under the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) has the main responsibility to ensure that member states maintain accountability of nuclear 
material kept within their borders. Even so, there have been incidents where nuclear material has been 
found out of regulatory control [Wallenius et al., 2006; Wallenius et al., 2007; Keegan et al., 2014]. 
Between 1993 and early 2019, the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) has reported 3387 
incidents involving nuclear material or other radioactive material out of regulatory control. Of these 
incidents, 759 have been associated with criminal activity and 16 of the criminal events have involved 
nuclear material usable for nuclear weapons (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) [ITDB, 2019].  
Whereas the safeguards organization is meant to prevent incidents involving nuclear material, there is 
also a need for bringing actors who have handled nuclear material illegally to justice [UNSCR 1540, 
2004]. The purpose of legal proceedings may be twofold: deterrence and retribution. The deterrence 
is directed against both non-state actors as well as against states. Since production of nuclear material 
is both resource demanding and a complex process, state involvement and a state’s knowledge of the 
presence of nuclear material production is considered unavoidable.  A confiscation of nuclear material 
found out of regulatory control would imply that a state has failed to follow international resolutions 
and agreements such as UNSCR 1540 [2004] concerning nuclear material. This concern would reinforce 
a state’s will to control nuclear material and thereby deter from both negligence and proliferation. To 
help in these legal proceedings there has been a need for forensic science that focuses on the 
information that can be provided from the nuclear material itself, to complement traditional forensic 
evidence. 
Nuclear forensic science is a scientific discipline that has been developing for the last 25 years, 
following the surge of cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The aim of nuclear forensics is to aid criminal investigations concerning nuclear- or other 
radioactive material to find the origin and intended use of the seized material, i.e. the attribution. 
Commonly, the investigated material is nuclear material such as uranium and plutonium, but also 
radioactive sources may be the subject of investigation. Furthermore, there are other radionuclides, 
such as 241Am, that are fissionable and hence sometimes referred to as alternative nuclear material 
[IAEA, 2002]. 
1.1 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the work presented in this thesis has been to investigate and develop signatures that 
may be useful in the field of nuclear forensics using gamma spectrometry and mass spectrometry as 
measurement techniques. For nuclear material, both techniques can be used. Gamma spectrometry is 
a robust, fairly quick, non-destructive technique but requires macroscopic amounts of material to be 
useful. Mass spectrometry, on the other hand, provides accurate and precise results with very small 
amounts of material, but is a destructive technique that often requires extensive sample preparation 
such as dissolution of the material followed by chemical separations. For solid-sample mass 
spectrometric techniques, such as laser ablation and SIMS, the sample preparation is minimal. 
However, a practical requirement for measuring radionuclides using mass spectrometry is that the 
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nuclides have sufficiently long half-lives. Another advantage of mass spectrometry is, of course, that 
non-radioactive elements, such as certain trace elements, also can be measured.  
The first two papers concern measurements of radioactive material using hand-held gamma 
spectrometry. These gamma detectors are commonly used by first-responders or customs, or in early 
stages of a nuclear forensic investigation, i.e. in the detection and identification as well as in a basic 
characterization of the material at e.g. the site of incident. Paper I shows some of the difficulties when 
attempting to categorize uranium using low-resolution gamma spectrometry and intends to explain 
why categorizations may be erroneous. Furthermore, the risk of making erroneous decisions based on 
low-resolution measurements is highlighted. Paper II shows what kind of characteristics can be 
extracted from a simple high-resolution gamma spectrometric measurement of a strong radioactive 
source containing the alpha-emitter 241Am. These characteristics could be included in a National 
Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) to help identify a radioactive source found out of regulatory control.  
The last two papers deal with measurements of stable elements in uranium material using ICP-MS that 
can be used for either origin attribution or for comparison between different materials. In Paper III, a 
comparison is made between interfered and interference-free measurements. The paper shows two 
methods to produce precise and interference-free lanthanide patterns using ICP-MS for uranium 
attribution. Paper IV shows that by decreasing the measurement uncertainty in trace element 
measurements to be able to compare small differences in analyte concentration of stable elements for 
nuclear forensic purposes, it can be shown that certified reference materials may have underestimated 
uncertainties and/or a concentration bias. The paper also shows the difference between using ordinary 
least squares regression, which is frequently applied to external calibration in the literature, and 
weighted least squares regression, which is the correct statistical approach for evaluation. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF NUCLEAR EVENTS 
In 1938 Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann irradiated uranium with neutrons and discovered that one 
resulting entity from the irradiations was barium, but they could not explain how this was possible 
[Hahn and Strassmann, 1939]. Shortly after, Lise Meitner and her nephew Otto Frisch devised the 
theoretical explanation that the neutron irradiation splits the uranium atom into two nuclei of roughly 
equal size, which would explain the presence of barium observed by Hahn and Strassmann. They also 
explained that energy is released in the process [Meitner and Frisch, 1939]. By this, fission was 
discovered and shortly after, it was found that the neutrons produced in the fission could cause a chain 
reaction [Zinn and Szilard, 1939]. In the Frisch-Peierls memorandum, written in 1940, Rudolf Peierls 
and Otto Frisch presented the first technical description of the possibility of utilizing the fission chain 
reaction in a bomb construction using uranium enriched in 235U [Arnold, 2003], and July 16 1945, the 
first nuclear test, the “Trinity” test, was conducted in New Mexico, U.S. The test was followed by the 
atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki shortly after. Soon, technical details on the construction 
of the atomic bomb leaked to the Soviet Union, and when the Soviet Union had implemented the 
nuclear weapons technology in 1949, when the first Soviet test was conducted, the nuclear arms race 
became a part of the Cold War.  
The IAEA was established in 1957 after the “Atoms for Peace” initiative by the U.S. president Dwight 
D. Eisenhower to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and to prevent nuclear material to be used 
for military purposes [Fischer, 1997]. The original idea was that the IAEA would serve as a bank for 
nuclear material. A safeguards organization was created to ensure that nuclear material was not used 
for military purposes. However, the Cold War prevented the implementation of the IAEA as a nuclear 
material protector. Instead, while the nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes spread 
across the world, so did the nuclear weapons technology. For example, the plutonium used for the 
Indian nuclear weapons programme was produced in a research reactor supplied by Canada [Fischer, 
1997]. By 1968, five countries around the world had nuclear weapons technology and, furthermore, 
conducted nuclear weapons tests. It became clear that the spread of this knowledge and technology 
had to be stopped. In 1970, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force. 
2.2 NUCLEAR SECURITY 
The NPT can be described as having three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of 
nuclear technology. The first part, non-proliferation, obligates the nuclear weapons states not to share 
nuclear weapons or technology related to nuclear weapons with states that do not have nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, non-nuclear weapons states are obligated not to receive or develop nuclear 
weapons technology. In addition, non-nuclear weapons states are obligated to accept IAEA safeguards 
to verify that the nuclear technology within the state is used for peaceful purposes. The safeguards 
organization maintains credible assurance that nuclear material under safeguards is used for peaceful 
aims and is not converted into nuclear weapons [NPT/CONF.2015/13, 2015]. The second pillar, 
disarmament, implies that the nuclear weapons states are obligated to pursue the complete 
disarmament of nuclear weapons, and the third pillar gives the states the right to develop and use 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, e.g. nuclear energy [Reed and Stillman, 2009]. Despite the 
NPT, a few states have developed and tested nuclear weapons after the implementation of the treaty. 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there were suddenly three new nuclear weapons states, 
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Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. However, these three states soon transferred their stock of nuclear 
weapons to the Russian Federation [Reed and Stillman, 2009]. In the aftermath of the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, seizures of illicit radiological and nuclear material at borders started to increase rapidly. 
Concerns that a black market for nuclear material was developing, resulted in the growing interest to 
be able to identify the origin of seized material, i.e. a forensic science focussed on nuclear and other 
radioactive materials [Mayer and Glaser, 2015].  
After the 9/11 attacks, concerns were raised about the possibility for terrorists to use nuclear or other 
radioactive material for their objectives. Three ways for terrorist groups to obtain nuclear material 
have been proposed [Litwak, 2016]. One option, indigenous production, is that the terrorist group, 
without the aid of a state, could build a nuclear weapon. This option is considered unlikely due to the 
complexity and the technical skill needed to construct a nuclear weapon. Somewhat more likely is the 
event that a terrorist group obtains weapons grade nuclear material and weaponizes the material 
without the involvement of a state. The second option, transfer, is that a terrorist group acquires a 
functioning nuclear weapon, by the aid of a state. A third way for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons 
is by “unintended leakage” such as theft and insider operations. A perhaps more likely event is the 
antagonistic use of radioactive sources in combination with explosives, so called Radiological 
Dispersion Devices (RDD), or more colloquially “dirty bombs”, where the explosives are used to 
disperse radioactive material in a selected location. These events may not be as disastrous as a nuclear 
weapon detonation but on a psychological level, it has been suggested that the fear spread by such a 
device may be as serious as that caused by a nuclear device [Litwak, 2016]. 
While terrorist groups may not be deterred from using nuclear weapons by threat of retaliation from 
the international community, the proliferation of nuclear weapons may be prevented by deterring 
states from, by either neglect or intention, conveying nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons material 
to terrorist organisations. Under the threat of the possibility to attribute nuclear material, found out 
of regulatory control, to a certain state, states will be forced to comply with international agreements 
by maintaining nuclear security to avoid retaliation from either the international community or 
another state [Litwak, 2016].  
A number of initiatives have been realised to highlight the importance of nuclear security. The Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) was initiated in 2006 as a joint effort between Russia 
and the United States. The aim of GICNT is to strengthen the global capability to prevent, detect and 
respond to nuclear terrorism. The organization is open to any state that is committed to implementing 
the eight principles in the Statement of principles [GICNT, 2018]. As of early 2019, 88 nations and 6 
organizations were members.  
To handle events with nuclear material and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, the 
IAEA has established a nuclear security programme. This programme focuses on prevention and 
detection of and response to criminal or other unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive 
material [IAEA, 2011]. The IAEA recommends each state to implement a nuclear security infrastructure 
to protect nuclear and radioactive material within its borders. The state should also have the ability to 
“prevent, detect and respond to nuclear security events” [IAEA, 2015]. The preventive measures 
involve deterrence, ensuring information security and trustworthiness of personnel by the 
implementation of a “nuclear security culture”. The detection measures should involve detection by 
instruments as well as information alerts. The response measures involve the actions that follow a 
detected nuclear security event and includes notification and activation of all relevant authorities 
including the initiation of investigations concerning the event. For the purpose of both deterrence and 
response, nuclear forensics plays an important part. 
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2.3 NUCLEAR FORENSICS 
The aim of nuclear forensics is to find the attribution of unknown nuclear and other radioactive 
material. The attribution assessment is used to determine the origin of the material, the intended use 
and the responsible individuals connected to the material [Hutcheon et al., 2013]. Methodology in 
nuclear forensics includes measurements of radioactive nuclides as well as stable elements that can 
be used to link a material to another material, facility or even a geographical location. Many methods 
in nuclear forensics are based on methods used in other disciplines such as age dating and lanthanide 
analysis, both commonly employed in geology [Cheong et al., 2015; Lobato et al., 2015]. However, a 
major difference between nuclear forensics and, for instance, geology is the need for quality assurance 
to meet the high legal and scientific scrutiny [Leggitt et al., 2009].  Therefore, a considerable amount 
of the conducted research focuses on improving the measurement accuracy and minimizing 
uncertainties [Williams et al., 2014]. Nuclear forensics often combines laboratory methods used for 
ordinary analysis of nuclear and other radioactive material and interpretation of the analysis results to 
provide technical conclusions about, for example, seized illicit nuclear or radioactive materials [Kristo 
and Tumey, 2013].  
A nuclear forensic investigation can be divided into three parts [IAEA, 2006]: 
- Categorization 
The IAEA report “Nuclear Forensics Support” [2006] states that “categorization is used to address the 
threat posed by a specific incident”. The aim of the categorization is to identify the safety risk to first 
responders and to the public, as well as to evaluate whether the incident is part of criminal activity 
and/or a threat to national security. One example of need for categorization may be the interception 
of uranium at a border control. The categorization done at this stage could include gamma 
spectrometric measurements of the material. Measuring the enrichment of the uranium would 
provide information on how to proceed with confiscation or even if a crime has been committed. 
- Characterization 
Characterization handles the determination of specific characteristics of the material. Table 1 lists 
some useful techniques and methods and gives a recommended sequencing of analysis to give the 
most valuable information early in an investigation without limiting the possibility of subsequent 
analyses [IAEA, 2015]. The table is a recommendation from the Nuclear Forensics International 
Technical Working Group (ITWG), which is an association of nuclear forensics practitioners. Important 
nuclear forensic characteristics include isotopic and elemental composition and physical 
characteristics.  
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The isotopic composition analysis can be performed using gamma or alpha spectrometry or any of the 
mass spectrometric techniques depending on sample size [Ramebäck et al., 2012]. The isotopic 
composition provides information about the intended use of the nuclear material but can also reveal 
if e.g. a uranium material is reprocessed [Zsigrai et al., 2015]. Elemental composition, or impurity 
measurements, is the measurement of remaining elemental impurities and can be used to explain the 
production process of the nuclear material or the geographical origin of the source material [Healy and 
Button, 2013; Varga et al., 2010a]. Physical characterization is used to tell the grain size or the chemical 
phase of a material and is mainly performed using surface characterization techniques such as scanning 
electron microscopy (SEM) and x-ray diffraction (XRD) but also other, more basic techniques, such as 
dimensions, mass determination and density measurements [Holmgren Rondahl et al., 2018; Sweet et 
al., 2013]. Another useful characteristic is the age of a material, i.e. the time that has passed since the 
last separation. The idea of age dating is to investigate the relation between a mother nuclide and the 
ingrowth of a daughter nuclide [Eppich et al., 2013; Gehrke and East, 2000; Nygren et al., 2007; 
Ramebäck et al., 2008; Varga et al., 2011]. The principles of age dating are explained in Chapter 3. 
 
Table 1 Suggested priorities for common characterization methods [IAEA, 2015]. 
Techniques/Methods 24 h One week Two months 
Radiological Dose rate   
 Surface 
contamination 
  
 Radiography   
Physical Visual inspection SEM TEM 
 Photography XRD  
 Mass determination   
 Dimensions   
 Optical microscopy   
 Density   
Traditional forensics 
Collection of 
evidence 
 Analysis and 
interpretation 
Isotope analysis 
Gamma 
spectrometry 
TIMS SIMS 
  ICP-MS 
Radiometric 
techniques 
Radiochronometry 
Gamma 
spectrometry (for Pu) 
TIMS 
Gamma 
spectrometry (for U) 
  ICP-MS Alpha spectrometry 
Elemental/chemical 
analysis 
XRF ICP-MS GC-MS 
  IDMS  
  FTIR  
  Assay (Titration, IDMS)  
  SEM/X ray spectrometry  
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- Nuclear Forensic Interpretation 
The results acquired in the characterization are used in the nuclear forensic interpretation where 
possible connections between materials and events are evaluated. Nuclear forensic analysis can be 
divided into two groups: comparative and predictive analysis [Hutcheon et al., 2013]. A measurement 
technique or a measurand can be used both for comparative and predictive analysis, depending on the 
question.  The comparative analyses can be used to answer questions such as “Do these materials have 
the same origin?” or “Does this material correspond to any material in the database or any material 
we have knowledge about?” The predictive analyses, on the other hand, can be used to explain the 
origin of the material, processes the material has undergone and intended use of the material. For 
example, the isotopic composition can be used to compare different samples to see whether it is likely 
that they are originating from the same batch, but the composition can also be used to explain the 
intended use of the material and possibly the production process. Thus, the nuclear forensic 
interpretation is used for both linking materials and events to each other, and for the determination 
of the intention of the nuclear security event. The nuclear forensic interpretation requires highly skilled 
experts, so called subject matter experts (SME), who can interpret the analysis results and assess the 
significance of the findings [Mayer and Glaser, 2015]. 
2.3.1 National Nuclear Forensics Libraries 
The IAEA encourages its member states to implement a national system for identification of nuclear 
and other radioactive material found out of regulatory control, to support nuclear security and non-
proliferation [IAEA, 2018]. To determine whether a seized material originates from a state, a register 
of the nuclear material and other radioactive material held within a country can be helpful. This 
register is often referred to as a National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) and may consist of reference 
information regarding nuclear material and radioactive sources. Ideally, this compilation of data would 
be available to the international community, but due to the sensitive nature of the information, the 
aim is to keep the libraries at a national level. The IAEA, however, encourages information sharing 
between countries when needed, either by direct contact between states or by using an international 
organization as the intermediary [IAEA, 2018; Mayer and Glaser, 2015].  
The library may contain information that can be used to compare with data from analyses in nuclear 
forensic investigations, as well as with information from manufacturers. It is also possible to include 
archive samples of different sources in the library to facilitate ad hoc comparisons of characteristics of 
an investigated material and samples in the archive [Wacker and Curry, 2011]. Another crucial part in 
an NNFL is subject matter expertise to aid in the determination of what information to include and 
how it should be interpreted [Borgardt et al, 2017]. The aim of the NNFL is to ensure that nuclear 
material and radioactive sources are identifiable and traceable, or when this is not feasible, ensure 
that there are alternative processes for identifying and tracing sources [IAEA, 2004; IAEA, 2015]. The 
complexity of the NNFL may depend on a state’s nuclear and radioactive material holdings. The 
signatures could be used to compare with the NNFL in order to determine whether a seized material 
is consistent with material that has been produced, used or stored within a state. 
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3 THEORY 
3.1 NUCLEAR FORENSIC SIGNATURES 
3.1.1 Isotopic ratios 
In categorization of nuclear material, isotopic ratio measurements provide the enrichment of e.g. 
uranium, which will reveal the intended use of the material. In characterization, the isotopic ratio 
measurements will provide means for the comparison of different materials and, in addition, reveal 
whether the material has been reprocessed or not. Isotopic ratio measurements can be performed 
with either radiometric or mass-spectrometric techniques depending on the nuclides in question. 
3.1.2 Radiochronometry 
Radiochronometry is an important tool for nuclear forensics as, unlike many other signatures, it is a 
predictive signature that does not necessarily need a comparison to other materials to be useful 
[Mayer and Glaser, 2015].  
The time that has passed since the last chemical separation is referred to as the age of a nuclear or 
other radioactive material. The age can be assessed by measuring the relation between the mother 
nuclide and its progeny. The rationale is that, at the time of separation, only the mother nuclide is 
present, e.g. uranium nuclides or 241Am while all daughter products have been completely removed in 
the separation process. With time, the daughter nuclides will grow in and by measuring the ratio 
between the mother and daughter nuclide, the age of the material can be calculated. When performing 
radiochronometry, a few assumptions have to be made. The first assumption is that, at the time of 
separation (t=0), all of the daughter nuclides are removed. The second assumption is that the material 
is contained in a closed system, i.e. as the daughter nuclides grow in they remain in the material and 
is not removed by any process [Sturm et al., 2014]. Since these assumptions may be difficult to confirm, 
the measured age, also called the model age may not be the same as the actual age, i.e. the sample 
age. Another requirement for radiochronometry is that the mother and daughter nuclide are in 
radioactive disequilibrium. This means that not all mother/daughter-pairs are useful for 
radiochronology. 
Radioactive decay can be described according to: 
X1
𝜆1
→ X2
𝜆2
→X3
𝜆3
→…   (1) 
where λi is the decay constant for radionuclide Xi. The age of a material, t, can, in the case of two 
successive decays, be calculated according to 
𝑡 =
1
𝜆1−𝜆2
∙ ln⁡(1 − (1 −
𝜆1
𝜆2
)
𝐴2
𝐴1
)  (2) 
where Ai is the activity of radionuclide Xi. The corresponding expression of the age performed by 
atom counting (mass spectrometry) is analogous to Eq. 2.  
In cases where the half-life of the daughter X3 is substantially shorter than the half-life of X2, the X3 
activity will rapidly grow into secular equilibrium and equal that of X2. This means that X3 will decay 
with the half-life of X2. In this case, it is possible to use the A3/A1 activity ratio together with the decay 
constant of X2 in Eq. 2 to calculate the age of the material. This may be convenient in cases where the 
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gamma photon yield of radionuclide X2 is too small to be detected with gamma spectrometry within 
reasonable measurement time. One such example is given in Paper II. The age determination of 241Am 
was performed by using the granddaughter 233Pa to 241Am instead of its daughter 237Np, since the 
photon emission probability of 237Np are too small to be visible in a high activity 241Am spectrum. The 
half-lives of 241Am, 237Np and 233Pa are 432.6 y, 2.144·106 y and 26.98 d, respectively [DDEP, 2018]. 
3.1.3 Trace elemental impurities 
Trace elemental impurities are elements found in a material that have not been deliberately added to 
the material [Lützenkirchen et al., 2019]. One common example in the field of nuclear forensics is trace 
elements found in uranium material. These impurities can either originate from the geological deposit 
and remain in the uranium ore concentrate (UOC) after milling, or from the various processes the 
material undergo. Therefore, the trace elements can be used both to compare materials to each other 
and to estimate the type of processes the material has passed [Varga et al., 2017]. Elements that have 
been added intentionally in the material and that are relevant for the properties of the material are 
called additives and are, in general, substantially more abundant than trace elements. 
3.1.3.1 Lanthanide patterns 
Lanthanide patterns have been considered a good predictor of geographical origin of uranium material 
for some time [Mercadier et al, 2011]. The lanthanide series comprises 15 elements, whereof 14 are 
naturally occurring. The 15th, promethium, does not have any stable isotopes and is therefore omitted 
from the lanthanide patterns.  The composition of the lanthanides depends on the geological processes 
that the material have undergone. Examples of different lanthanide patterns are shown in Figure 1. 
The lanthanide patterns originate from different types of uranium ore formations. Due to 
environmental conditions, such as temperature and salinity during the ore formation process, the 
lanthanides will fractionate [Mercadier et al, 2011]. The reason why the lanthanide series is a good 
indicator for geographical origin is that all the lanthanides are trivalent under normal conditions and 
have similar characteristics. Therefore, the relative abundance of the lanthanides in a material remain, 
on a relatively short time scale, even though the material undergo various processes. The exceptions 
are cerium and europium that, additionally to the trivalent state, may be tetravalent and divalent, 
respectively.  
The measured concentrations of lanthanides in a sample is often normalised to chondrite to allow for 
an easier interpretation of geological processes. The normalised values are then plotted in increasing 
atomic number to receive the lanthanide pattern. Chondrite is a meteoritic material that is assumed 
to represent the average concentrations of elements in the solar system, and the assumption is that 
the composition of the lanthanides on earth as a whole is the same as that of the chondrite meteorites. 
Due to various processes during the history of Earth, the lanthanides have fractionated [White, 2013; 
Prohaska et al., 1999]. By normalizing the lanthanides measured in a sample to chondrite values, 
geologists can use the information given by the pattern to explain the history and source of a rock 
[White, 2013]. Another reason for presenting the lanthanides as chondrite normalised abundances 
rather than absolute concentrations is that all odd-numbered elements, with only a few exceptions, 
are less abundant than their even-numbered neighbours, resulting in a saw tooth-shaped lanthanide 
pattern. The normalisation produces a smooth pattern that is more easily interpretable [White, 2013].  
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Figure 1 Examples of  chondrite normalized lanthanide patterns from four different geographical origins. Top left: Vein-type 
from Commanderie, France, Top right: Roll-front from Kazakhstan, Bottom left: Synmetamorphic from Mistamisk and 
Bottom right: Volcanic-related from Streltsovskoye. Data from Mercadier [2011]. 
 
Uranium is commonly found as an oxide in nature. Due to their similar ionic radii, the elements in the 
lanthanide series are often found together with uranium in non-negligible amounts. Therefore, many 
papers have suggested lanthanide patterns as a good indicator of geographical origin of uranium 
[Frimmel et al., 2014; Fryer and Taylor, 1987; Mercadier et al., 2011; Spano et al., 2017; Varga et al., 
2010a]. 
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3.1.3.2 Measurements of lanthanides in uranium material 
Due to the generally low abundance of lanthanides in uranium materials, lanthanide measurements 
require a measurement technique with low detection limits. Mass spectrometry is such a technique, 
even though there are some difficulties in measuring lanthanide concentrations using ICP-MS 
[Vaughan and Horlick, 1990; Dulski, 1994]. The heavy uranium matrix may cause matrix effects with a 
following decrease in measurement sensitivity and signal stability [Tan and Horlick, 1987; Beauchemin 
et al., 1987]. This will in turn increase the detection limits. The high amount of uranium introduced 
into the instrument may also cause memory effects, i.e. high uranium backgrounds that may be 
difficult to eliminate. To solve this problem Varga et al. proposed a method for group separation of the 
lanthanide series to remove uranium and barium from the samples using a resin based on CMPO/TBP 
(TRU resin) [2010b].  
Many of the lanthanides have many isotopes and therefore there is a number of isobars among the 
lanthanides. There is, however, at least one isotope of each lanthanide free of isobars. Another 
problem with measuring lanthanides using ICP-MS is the presence of polyatomic interferences such as 
oxides and hydrides. Especially lighter lanthanides, such as cerium and praseodymium are prone to 
oxide formation. These oxides will interfere with the heavier lanthanides [Dulski, 1994; Longerich et 
al., 1987]. One such example is 141Pr16O+ that interferes with 157Gd+. This may cause a problem since 
the lighter lanthanides often are more abundant than the heavier ones in uranium bearing material. 
The interference may then be a substantial part of the measured signal of the heavier elements. The 
lanthanides and their most prominent interferences can be seen in Figure 2. Each isotope is coloured 
in green, yellow or red to illustrate that quantification using the isotopes is suitable, suitable with 
caution and unsuitable, respectively. To be able to use the isotopes marked in yellow for accurate 
quantification, the interferences should be addressed [Vesterlund et al, 2014]. 
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m/z Ba La Ce Pr Nd Sm Eu Gd Tb Dy Ho Er Tm Yb Lu 
130 0.11                             
131                               
132 0.1                             
133                               
134 2.42                             
135 6.59                             
136 7.85   0.19                         
137 11.23                             
138 71.7 0.089 0.25                         
139 
138BaH 99.911                           
140   
139LaH 88.45                         
141     
140CeH 100                       
142     11.11 
141PrH 27.2                     
143     
142CeH   12.2                     
144         23.8 3.1                   
145         8.3                     
146 
130BaO       17.2                     
147 
130BaOH       
146NdH 15                   
148 
132BaO       5.8 11.3                   
149 
132BaOH       
148NdH 13.8                   
150 
134BaO       5.6 7.4                   
151 
135BaO       
150NdH 150SmH 48                 
152 
136BaO   
136CeO     26.7 
151EuH 0.2               
153 
137BaO         
152SmH 52                 
154 
138BaO   
138CeO     22.7 
153EuH 2.18               
155 
138BaOH 139LaO       
154SmH   14.8               
156   
139LaOH 140CeO         20.47   0.056           
157     
140CeOH 141PrO       15.65               
158     
142CeO 141PrOH 142NdO     24.84   0.095           
159     
142CeOH   
143NdO     
158GdH 100             
160         
144NdO 144SmO   21.86 
159TbH 2.329           
161         
145NdO 144SmOH   
160GdH   18.889           
162         
146NdO         25.475   0.14       
163         
146NdOH 147SmO       24.896           
164         
148NdO 148SmO       28.26   1.6       
165         
148NdOH 149SmO       
164DyH 100         
166         
150NdO 150SmO         
165HoH 33.5       
167         
150NdOH 150SmOH 151EuO         22.87       
168           
152SmO 151EuOH 152GdO       26.98   0.12   
169           
152SmOH 153EuO         
168ErH 100     
170           
154SmO 153EuOH 154GdO       14.91 
169TmH 2.98   
171           
154SmOH   
155GdO       
170ErH   14.09   
172               
156GdO   
156DyO       21.69   
173               
157GdO   
164DyOH       16.1   
174               
158GdO   
158DyO       32.03   
175               
158GdOH 159TbO 164DyOH       
174YbH 97.4 
176               
160GdO 159TbOH 160DyO       13 2.6 
Figure 2  Isotopes of the lanthanides with abundances [Meija et al, 2016] and their most prominent hydride, oxide and 
hydroxide interferences in ICP-MS, based on water and nitric acid chemistry. The green marked isotopes are not interfered or 
only slightly interfered and can be used for quantitative determination. The red marked isotopes should be avoided for 
quantitative measurements. The yellow marked isotopes are the best choices for the interfered elements and may be used 
for determination. Barium is included to show the importance of considering this element when measuring the lanthanides. 
All oxides in the chart refer to 16O+.  
Many ways of avoiding the impact of polyatomic interferences have been proposed. Neutron 
activation analysis (NAA) is a non-mass spectrometric technique that provides relatively low detection 
limits but requires access to a research reactor [Bulska et al., 2012; Dampare et al., 2005]. Funderberg 
et al. [2017] has presented a method for measuring the lanthanide series using medium-resolution LA-
ICP-MS (laser ablation ICP-MS) which allows for peak separation of the polyatomic interferences from 
the analytes. However, the method did not resolve the interference of e.g. 143Nd16O+ on 159Tb+. The 
resolution needed to resolve these peaks is approximately 7700. Using higher resolution also 
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decreases the sensitivity that may be required to measure low concentrations with good accuracy and 
precision [Nelms, 2005]. Attempts have been made to correct for these interferences mathematically 
[Raut et al., 2003; Vaughan and Horlick, 1990] but this approach may lead to large measurement 
uncertainties if the correction is large compared to the analyte in question and may require extensive 
measurements each day of analysis [Simitchiev et al., 2008]. Groopman et al. [2017] has presented the 
SIMS-SSAMS (secondary ion mass spectrometry-single stage accelerator mass spectrometry) as an 
excellent technique for providing interference free lanthanide patterns at low concentrations. 
However, this technique is rare and therefore there is a need for more available mass spectrometric 
techniques. Inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) is a widespread, multi-elemental 
technique that is suitable for the purpose due to low detection limits for these elements.  
Many papers have put forward the possibility of performing chemical separations for at least some of 
the elements in the lanthanide series to remove interfering lanthanide oxides. Pin and Zalduegui [1997] 
used a combination of TRU resin (CMPO/TBP) and Ln resin (HDEHP) to separate thorium and uranium 
and light rare earth elements, LREE, respectively for measurement of neodymium isotope ratios and 
concentrations of uranium, thorium, neodymium and samarium. Another example is Yang et al [2010] 
who presented a separation method using Ln resin for measuring both Sm-Nd and Lu-Hf isotope 
systems used for geochronological dating. 
3.2 MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
3.2.1 Gamma spectrometry 
Gamma spectrometry is a non-destructive measurement method for gamma emitting radionuclides. 
The instruments used for gamma spectrometry can be divided into low- and high-resolution 
instruments. Low-resolution instruments such as NaI(Tl) scintillation detectors [Knoll, 2000] are 
commonly used as first-responder or customs instruments, but the ability of these instruments to 
identify radionuclides has been shown to be unsatisfactory [Blackadar et al. 2003; Nelson et al., 2011; 
Pibida et al., 2004]. This is mainly due to the low-resolution characteristics. A number of publications 
have put forward different identification algorithms but the problem seems to remain [Estep et al., 
1998; Hofstetter et al., 2008; Sprinkle Jr et al., 1997]. The instrument is not able to separate peaks that 
are close in energy, which makes the instrument a blunt tool for identification and requires highly 
qualified users in many cases. However, this is not always enough since the resolution often prohibits 
even manual identification. The instrument used in Paper I does have the ability to automatically 
evaluate both measured nuclides as well as the category regarding uranium. High-resolution 
instruments, high purity germanium detectors (HPGe) [Knoll, 2000], do not have this problem.  
An advantage of low-resolution instruments is that they operate at room temperature as opposed to 
HPGe detectors that require cooling. The need for cooling in HPGe detectors somewhat limits its 
flexibility. Another advantage of the low-resolution detectors is that the acquisition is fast due to the 
high measurement efficiency since e.g. NaI(Tl) detectors can be produced with a much larger volume 
compared to HPGe detectors. 
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3.2.1.1 Absolute and relative efficiency calibrations 
As the measurement efficiency of a gamma spectrometric system is energy dependent, the detectors 
need carefully executed efficiency calibrations in order to make accurate activity and activity ratio 
measurements. This is normally done by using a calibration solution containing a number of 
radionuclides with known, certified activities and with energies covering the energy region in question. 
The radioactivity of isotope x, Ax, evaluated from a gamma spectrometric measurement is given by 
𝐴x =
𝐶x,γ
𝑡∙𝐼x,γ∙Ψγ
    (3) 
where cx,γ and Ix,γ are the number of counts and photon emission probability of isotope x at energy Eγ, 
respectively, t is the measurement time and Ψγ is the measurement efficiency at energy Eγ. The 
measurement efficiency is given by rearranging Eq. 3: 
Ψγ =
𝐶x,γ
𝑡∙𝐼x,γ∙𝐴x
    (4) 
Hence, the calibration spectra and the certificate information for each energy can be used to fit a 
response function by using an empirical equation. In this work the 5-term equation previously 
published by Ramebäck et al. [2010] where c1,…, c5 are constants and E is the energy, has been used: 
Ψ(𝐸) = 𝑒𝑐1+
𝑐2
𝐸2⁄
+𝑐3∙(ln(𝐸))
2+𝑐4(ln(𝐸))
3+
𝑐5
𝐸⁄    (5) 
In special cases, where the absolute activity is unimportant, such as in activity or isotope ratio 
determinations, it is possible to construct a relative calibration if there is a radionuclide in the sample 
with a number of gamma lines covering the energy region of interest. As the activity is equal for all 
calibration points, Eq. 4 can be simplified and the relative measurement efficiency for a certain gamma 
line is then given by  
Ψrel,⁡γ =
𝐶x,γ
𝐼x,γ
    (6) 
The calculated Ψrel,γ can be used to fit Eq. 5 in the same manner. The advantage of using inherent 
calibrations is that the sample geometry including absorbing materials between the sample and the 
detector as well as sample composition is unimportant as opposed to absolute calibrations. The peaks 
used for the construction of an intrinsic response function for uranium abundance calculations in high-
resolution spectra are peaks in the low energy region for 235U and peaks in the high-energy region for 
234mPa. The condition for fitting the function is that the 234mPa peak at 258 keV is visible. This peak 
connects the low energy 235U peaks with the high-energy 234mPa peaks and enables a fit of a function 
over the whole energy region, from 144 keV to 1001 keV. For high-resolution instruments, this vital 
peak is visible in almost all uranium spectra except possibly spectra of very highly enriched uranium. 
In the case of very highly enriched uranium in the high-resolution case, it would be possible to use 
228Th daughters to establish the response function if the material contains reprocessed uranium (232U) 
[Ramebäck et al., 2010].  However, for low-resolution instruments, this peak is not discernible and, 
furthermore, the low resolution reduces the number of distinct peaks for the fitting of the response 
function from eight to two or possibly three peaks. Hence, the construction of an intrinsic response 
function of a low-resolution spectrum is not possible. Instead, the instrument must be calibrated for 
absolute efficiency for a certain measurement setup. 
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3.2.1.2 Categorization of uranium by gamma spectrometry 
Uranium can be categorized by evaluating the fraction of 235U of the total amount of uranium. Using 
gamma spectrometry, this can be done by using the 185.7 keV peak from 235U and the 1001 keV peak 
from 234mPa in the gamma spectrum, assuming radioactive equilibrium between 234mPa and 238U. Four 
months after separation, the activity difference between 234mPa and 238U is within the uncertainty of 
the gamma spectrometric measurement. Hence, radioactive equilibrium can be assumed after this 
period of time. The abundance of 235U, f235, is, if the abundance of minor uranium isotopes is neglected, 
given by 
𝑓235 =
𝑁235
𝑁235+𝑁238
     (7) 
where Nx is the number of atoms of uranium isotope x. When the enrichment of 235U approaches 90%, 
the 234U abundance is around 1% depending on the history of the material [Nguyen and Zsigrai, 2006]. 
Therefore, the amount of 234U, N234, is, in this case, considered negligible. Furthermore, the 185.7 keV 
peak is assumed not to be interfered by 226Ra. This assumption is made on the basis that there are no 
significant amounts of 226Ra in a processed anthropogenic uranium material due to the relatively young 
age. Moreover, the 226Ra originating from the background may be subtracted from the spectrum. 
Using the well-known relation 
𝐴x =
𝑁x∙ln⁡(2)
𝑡½,x
    (8) 
where t½,x is the half-life of isotope x in combination with Eq. 6-7, the abundance of 235U can be written 
as: 
𝑓235 =
𝑐235,185keV∙𝑡½,235
𝐼235,185keV∙Ψ185keV
⁄
𝑐235,185keV∙𝑡½,235
𝐼235,185keV∙Ψ185keV
⁄ +
𝑐238,1001keV∙𝑡½,238
𝐼238,1001keV∙Ψ1001keV
⁄
  (9) 
3.2.2 ICP-MS 
The mass spectrometer used in this work is a double focusing sector field ICP-MS, Element 2 (Thermo 
Scientific, Bremen, Germany). Double focusing means the ions are separated by both mass in a 
magnetic sector and by energy in an electrostatic analyser (ESA). The ESA may be placed either before 
or after the magnet sector (Nier-Johnson and reversed Nier-Johnson geometry, respectively). The 
instrument used in this work has the reversed Nier-Johnson geometry, which improves abundance 
sensitivity and reduces noise since the mass analyser reduces the high ion currents from the ion source 
and the only ions that reach the ESA are ions with the correct mass [Jakubowski et al., 1998]. 
3.2.2.1 Interferences 
Interferences in mass spectrometry can be divided into two groups, spectral and non-spectral 
interferences. 
3.2.2.1.1 Polyatomic interferences 
Common spectral interferences in mass spectrometry are the polyatomic interferences. These 
interferences are the result of two or more atoms in the matrix, solvent or plasma gas, forming a 
molecular species. The formation rate and type of molecule is largely dependent on the presence of 
isotopes and the plasma conditions [Nelms, 2005]. Common polyatomic species are argides, nitrides, 
oxides and hydrides due to the abundance of these elements in the plasma and the solvent 
[Jakubowski et al., 2011]. Due to the dependence on sample composition and plasma conditions, the 
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amount and type of polyatomic interferences may be difficult to predict, making mathematical 
interference corrections difficult to perform. One way to remove the interferences is to increase the 
resolution, but this measure may not be sufficient to remove all interferences [Funderberg et al., 
2017]. 
3.2.2.1.2 Isobars 
Many of the isotopes measurable with ICP-MS have isobars, i.e. isotopes of another element but with 
the same mass, such as 241Pu+ and 241Am+. This type of interference requires very high resolution for 
peak separation (up to 107 [Nelms, 2005]). Therefore, the options when measuring these isotopes are 
to either correct for the interference or remove the elements with interfering isotopes using chemical 
separations. Since the isobars in many cases are predictable it is possible to mathematically subtract 
the portion of the peak coming from the interfering isotope, assuming that the elements have a natural 
composition [Jakubowski et al., 2011]. 
3.2.2.1.3 Multiply charged ions 
Multiply charged ions arise when the atom loses more than one electron in the plasma. The detection 
of the formed ion will be at mass m/Z where Z is the charge of the ion. The probability of the formation 
of multiply charged ions is low since the second ionisation energy is substantially higher than the first 
ionisation energy but can cause interference problems if the interfering element is abundant in the 
measured samples. One such example is the measurement of trace lanthanides in a uranium matrix 
where 139La may be interfered by 238U40Ar++ [Boulyga et al., 2017]. 
3.2.2.1.4 Abundance sensitivity 
A fourth kind of spectral interference is the tailing of isotopes on neighbouring masses. Due to 
scattering of ions in the beam, the energy spread of the ions increases, resulting in higher abundance 
sensitivity [Becker, 2007]. A typical abundance sensitivity is between 10-7-10-6 [Nelms, 2005]. 
Therefore, the abundance sensitivity does not affect the measurement unless the ratio between the 
tailing isotope and the neighbouring isotope is >100000 [Nelms, 2005]. 
3.2.2.1.5 Non-spectral interferences 
Non-spectral interferences, or matrix effects, are effects that are not limited to a certain mass but 
cause an overall change in the analyte signal independent of the mass [Evans and Giglio, 1993; Nelms, 
2005]. The signal changes are caused by for example sample transport, ionization in the plasma and 
ion extraction. Another reason for signal suppression may be build-up of salts on the cones causing the 
orifices to clog [Evans and Giglio, 1993]. The level of the matrix effect depends on the concentration 
and nature of the matrix. A heavy matrix often leads to signal suppression and can be resolved by 
dilution or, to some extent, the use of an internal standard. Another way to minimize matrix effects is 
to chemically separate the analytes from matrix elements. 
Corrections for non-spectral interferences can be done by the use of an internal standard. The internal 
standard should be an element absent in the sample and show the same behaviour as the analyte in 
the plasma. It has been suggested that elements suitable as internal standards have mass and 
ionization potential close to the analyte [Thompson and Houk, 1987]. According to Vanhaecke et al. 
[1992], only the mass needs to be a close match for the internal standard to be appropriate. In this 
study, the impact of ionization potential was regarded as insignificant. 
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3.2.2.2 Quantification 
For quantification, different approaches such as isotope dilution, standard addition and external 
calibration, can be used. 
3.2.2.2.1 Isotope dilution 
The approach that usually provides the lowest measurement uncertainties is isotope dilution, where a 
spike with a different isotopic composition than the isotopic composition of the analyte in the sample, 
is added to the measured sample [Trešel et al., 2003]. Another possibility is to use an isotope, which is 
not naturally occurring, i.e. long-lived radioactive isotopes. One such example is the use of 233U for 
quantification of uranium [Kristo et al., 2015, Nelwamondo et al., 2018]. By knowing the isotopic 
compositions of the spike and the sample as well as the amount of added spike, the concentration of 
the sample can be determined. A limitation to this method is the lack of reference materials that are 
isotopically enriched to be useful for isotope dilution. Another limitation is that some elements, such 
as aluminium and yttrium, have only one stable isotope, which makes isotope dilution impossible. 
3.2.2.2.2 Standard addition 
In standard addition, increasing and known amounts of the analyte is added to the sample and by 
measuring the sample with an increasing amount of analyte spike, it is possible to calculate the amount 
of the analyte in the sample when no spike is added as the relation between signal intensity and the 
concentration is linear [Harris, 2003]. Standard addition limits the impact of matrix effects but may 
require tedious work, as every measured sample requires a number of measurements with different 
amounts of analyte spike. 
3.2.2.2.3 External calibration 
Due to the lack of isotopic spikes and the work effort of standard addition, the most commonly used 
method for quantitative measurements by ICP-MS is done using external calibration where calibration 
samples with a known amount of analyte are measured to establish a calibration with instrument signal 
as a function of concentration [Nelms, 2005]. In this way, unknown samples can be measured and the 
signal from the sample can be used to calculate the concentration. External calibrations using pure 
standard solutions do not take any matrix effects into account. Depending on the matrix, analyte 
concentrations in the sample can be over- or underestimated. Therefore, the calibration samples often 
need to be matrix-matched when the samples have a high matrix content, in order to provide a 
calibration that corresponds to the samples [Nelms, 2005]. 
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3.3 SEPARATION CHEMISTRY 
3.3.1 Solvent extraction 
The purpose of solvent extraction may be to preconcentrate the analyte(s), eliminate matrix 
interferences or to differentiate chemical species, and is a method to separate compounds depending 
on differentiating solubility in two immiscible phases, normally an aqueous phase and an organic 
phase. The distribution ratio, D, of a compound between the organic phase and the water phase can 
be expressed by: 
𝐷 =
[M]org
[M]aq
    (10) 
where [M]org and [M]aq is the total concentration, i.e. the concentration of all species of M, in the 
organic and aqueous phase, respectively [Nash, 2000]. The organic phase consists of an extractant that 
has the ability to extract the desired compound from the aqueous phase into the organic phase, i.e. 
making it more soluble in the organic phase. Sometimes a diluent is added to enhance the performance 
of the extractant. The goal of the extraction is to form an uncharged hydrophobic molecule that 
includes the wanted species, which can be dissolved in the organic phase.  
The extractants can be divided into different groups depending on the extraction mechanism [Rydberg, 
1992]. Some examples of extractants and their mechanisms are acidic extractants, basic or ion pair 
forming extractants and solvating or neutral extractants. The overall mechanism for acidic extractants, 
where the metal cation reacts with a suitable anion, the extractant, to form a neutral complex, can be 
written as 
Mn++nHA̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ⁡⇌⁡MAn̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +nH
+   (11) 
The ion pair forming extractant mechanism where the metal cation forms an ion pair with the 
extractant can be summarized as 
MXp
(n-p)-
+(n-p)R3NH+X-⁡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ⇌⁡R3NH(n-p)MXp̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + (n-p)X
-  (12) 
Correspondingly, the mechanism of solvating extractants where the coordinated water molecules are 
replaced by an organic solvating reagent can be written as 
MYq+rB̅̅ ̅⁡⇌⁡MYqBr̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +xH2O   (13) 
The species in reactions 11-13 with a line on top are species in the organic phase. In this work, 
commercial resins, Ln resin (Triskem, Bruz, France) based on di-2 ethylhexyl orthophosphoric acid 
(HDEHP) have been used. 
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3.3.2 Extraction using HDEHP 
HDEHP, see Figure 3, has for a long time been used for the separation of lanthanides and other trivalent 
elements and the properties of the HDEHP extractant system has been thoroughly investigated 
[Qureshi et al., 1969; Alstad et al., 1974; Peppard et al., 1957].  
 
Figure 3. Structural formula of HDEHP. 
The overall reaction is assumed to be:  
M3+ + 3(HDEHP)2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ⇌ M(H(DEHP)2)3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 3H
+  (14) 
where M3+ is the lanthanide ion [Alstad et al, 1974]. Peppard et al. [1957] showed that the extraction 
of the lanthanides show an inverse third-power dependence on the acid concentration which agrees 
with Eq. 14, and if the acid concentration increases, the extraction decreases, allowing for stripping of 
the extracted species. However, Alstad et al. [1974] showed that this dependence becomes directly 
proportional at nitric acid concentrations above approximately 5 M. Qureshi et al. [1969] proposed 
two possible mechanisms for this increased extraction: 
M3+ + 3X− +⁡(HDEHP)2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ⇌ MX3(HDEHP)2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (15) 
H+ + X− +⁡(HDEHP)2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ⇌ HX(HDEHP)2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   (16) 
where X- represents the anion of the acid. The proposed reaction in Eq. 15 indicates that increasing 
the amount of acid anion drives the extraction of the lanthanide to an HDEHP complex together with 
the anion, while Eq. 16 indicates that acid ions are removed from the aqueous phase that in turn leads 
to increased extraction of lanthanide ions according to Eq. 14. 
3.4 LINEAR REGRESSION 
Using external calibration in ICP-MS measurements involves the procedure of fitting a straight line to 
a number of calibration points with the analytical signal, y, as a function of concentration, x: 
𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑥    (17) 
where a and b are the estimates of intercept and slope of the line, respectively. The common method 
to evaluate this line is to use ordinary least squares regression (OLS) where the distance between the 
data points and the line along the y-axis is minimized [Miller and Miller, 2010]. The slope, b, is 
calculated according to Eq. 18. 
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𝑏 =
∑ [(𝑥𝑖−?̅?)(𝑦𝑖−?̅?)]𝑖
∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)2𝑖
   (18) 
where yi and xi are the signal intensity and the concentration of calibration point i, respectively, and ?̅? 
and ?̅? are the corresponding mean values of all calibration points. The intercept can then be calculated 
by Eq. 19: 
𝑎 = ?̅? − 𝑏?̅?    (19) 
However, in order for the OLS to be a valid method for establishing this line, a number of requirements 
need to be fulfilled [Raposo, 2016; Hubaux and Vos, 1970]: 
 A linear relationship between x and y. 
 The uncertainty of the concentrations on the x-axis is negligible.  
 The variance in y is homoscedastic. 
 Normally distributed variance in y. 
 
If at least one of these requirements are not fulfilled, the OLS will not provide the best estimate of the 
calibration line. Whereas the first and last point frequently are fulfilled in mass spectrometric 
measurements, the second point at least needs to be evaluated to check the validity of the OLS. 
However, the third point is almost exclusively invalid in mass spectrometry [Ketkar and Bzik, 2000]. In 
the case of mass spectrometry, the data points have heteroscedastic variance; the relative variance is 
the same with the exception of low measurement intensities where the relative variance is higher. 
Therefore, OLS is not a valid method for fitting a line to mass spectrometric calibration data. In OLS, 
each data point is given the same importance in the regression, which infers that, even though data 
points on the far right side of the calibration have higher absolute uncertainties, these data points have 
unreasonably large impact on the fitted line. This means that at low concentrations, the line does not 
represent the data points very well. 
To fit a line to heteroscedastic data another regression type such as weighted linear regression (WLS) 
should be used [Sayago, 2004]. In WLS, each data point is weighted with a suitable parameter, or 
weight factor, to give data points with low absolute variance higher importance in the regression. The 
classical approach is to use 1/sy2 as weight factor, where sy is the uncertainty in y [Deming, 1964] but 
also other weight factors such as 1/y or 1/x can be used if there is only one data point for each x 
[Almeida, 2002]. In WLS the slope, b, is calculated as 
𝑏 =
∑ 𝑤𝑖[(𝑥𝑖−?̅?𝑤)(𝑦𝑖−?̅?𝑤)]𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑥𝑖−?̅?𝑤)2𝑖
   (20) 
where wi is the weight factor at calibration point i and ?̅?𝑤 and ?̅?𝑤 are the weighted mean values of all 
yi and xi. The intercept, a, can be calculated in a corresponding manner to Eq. 19 with the exception 
that the weighted means of all calibration points are used rather than the means of x and y [Sayago 
and Asuero, 2004]: 
𝑎 = ?̅?𝑤 − 𝑏?̅?𝑤    (21) 
The detection limit, LD, used for external calibrations in this thesis is 
𝐿𝐷 = 𝑎 + 3𝑢𝑎    (22) 
where ua is the uncertainty of the intercept [Miller and Miller, 2010]. 
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4 EXPERIMENTAL 
4.1 MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY 
The measurement uncertainties presented in this work were evaluated according to ISO: Guide to the 
Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement, ISO/GUM [2008]. The results were calculated using GUM 
Workbench 2.4 (Metrodata GmbH, Grenzach-Wyhlen, Germany) and are presented with a coverage 
factor k=2, unless otherwise stated which corresponds to an approximate 95% confidence interval. 
4.2 LOW-RESOLUTION GAMMA SPECTROMETRY FOR URANIUM CATEGORIZATION 
4.2.1 Measurements 
Spectra were acquired of the following materials using the hand-held NaI(Tl) scintillation detector 
identiFINDER (ICx, FLIR Systems Inc., Wilsonville, USA): 
 Natural uranium as UO2 
 Low-enriched uranium with an approximately 4% enrichment as UO2 
 Depleted uranium as UO2 
 Natural uranium in an aqueous solution (IRMM-184, Geel, Belgium) 
 
Data was collected for 60 s at a distance of 10 cm from the source. The data from the certified reference 
material IRMM-184 was collected during 600 s due to low uranium content. The instrument reported 
the uranium category after the measurement using the automatic evaluation algorithm. The spectrum 
data was also downloaded for off-line evaluations according to Eq. 5 and Eq. 9. 
4.2.2 Simulations 
The following setups were simulated using the Monte Carlo based simulation software VGSL (Visual 
Gamma Spectroscopy Laboratory: 
 Water matrix,  = 1 g/cm3 
 UO2 matrix,  = 11 g/cm3 
 Uranium metal matrix,  = 19 g/cm3 
 Water matrix with a 1 mm lead shielding, Pb = 11 g/cm3 
 Water matrix with a 5 mm steel shielding, Steel = 7.5 g/cm3 
 
VGSL uses a modified version of MCNPX as particle transport simulation engine [Plenteda, 2002; 
Waters, 2002]. The detector was simulated to correspond to the identiFINDER. Therefore, the crystal 
dimensions and density were set to 35 x 51 mm2 and 3.7 g/cm3, respectively. Eq. 5 was fitted to each 
set of efficiency data retrieved from the simulations and the abundance of 235U according to Eq. 9 was 
calculated for each spectrum, with different response functions, from the peak areas at 185.7 keV and 
1001 keV. 
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4.3 SIGNATURES IN 241AM SOURCES 
Five sources were studied for investigation of possible signatures: 
 Source 1: 241Am sealed source contained in a lead shield during the gamma spectrometric 
measurement. Nominal activity 185 GBq. 
 Source 2: 241Am sealed source contained in a lead shield during the gamma spectrometric 
measurement. Nominal activity 185 GBq. 
 Source 3: 241Am sealed source measured with 1.1 mm Cd shielding. 
 Source 4: Electroplated 241Am source. Nominal activity 3.7 GBq. 
 Source 5: Ionising smoke detector containing an 241Am source. 
 
Source 1 and 2 were visually similar. Sources 1-4 were measured overnight, at a distance of about 30 
cm using a p-type coaxial high purity germanium detector (Detective-EX, EG&G Ortec, Oak Ridge, TN, 
USA) which has a relative efficiency of about 15% and a resolution of 2.5 keV at 1332 keV. The smoke 
detector, Source 5, was measured in a lead shield setup, using a p-type coaxial HPGe detector (EG&G 
Ortec, Oak Ridge, TN, USA) with a relative efficiency of 50% and a resolution of 2.0 keV at 1332 keV. 
The measurement time for Source 5 was approximately 1 week due to low activity of its daughter 
radionuclides. 
An intrinsic response function was established for each spectrum using 241Am lines between 59.5 and 
801.9 keV, see Table 2, and Eq.5. Using the response function, the activity of 233Pa relative to 241Am 
could be calculated and the ages of the sources could then be determined using Eq.2. The gamma lines 
used for the calculation was the 322.6 keV 241Am line and 311.9 keV 233Pa line. Furthermore, the 
relative activities of the impurity elements could be determined. 
Table 2 Gamma energies with corresponding photon emission probabilities used for the intrinsic calibration and the age 
determination. Data are taken from Decay Data Evaluation Project [2018]. 
 
 
 Eγ [keV] Iγ [%] 
241Am 59.5 35.92 
241Am 103.0 0.0195 
241Am 125.3 0.0041 
241Am 208.0 0.000786 
233Pa 300.1 6.6 
233Pa 311.9 38.3 
241Am 322.6 0.000151 
233Pa 340.5 4.47 
241Am 376.7 0.000137 
241Am 383.8 0.0000281 
233Pa 398.5 1.408 
241Am 619.0 0.000060 
241Am 662.4 0.000367 
241Am 722.0 0.000196 
241Am 801.9 0.0000012 
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4.4 LANTHANIDE PATTERN MEASUREMENTS 
Two reference materials were used for the study, REE-2 and CUP-2 (both CanmetMINING, Ottawa, 
Canada). REE-2 is certified for most lanthanides and has provisional values for the lanthanides that are 
not certified (includes gadolinium, ytterbium and lutetium). CUP-2 is a UOC and is not certified for 
lanthanides but is often used as a working reference material for lanthanide pattern measurements. 
The materials were dissolved by microwave digestion and lithium borate fusion, respectively. The 
samples were measured directly, after an appropriate dilution, using both a standard sample 
introduction system and a desolvating sample introduction system to study the difference in oxide 
formation and impact on polyatomic interferences on the elements in the lanthanide series. The 
samples were also measured after chemical separation where the samples were separated into three 
different fractions as a measure to avoid interferences. 
4.4.1 Oxide formation measurements 
To study the lanthanide oxide formation rate, single element standard solutions of each element in 
the lanthanide series, were diluted to 1 ng g-1, 10 ng g-1and 100 ng g-1. Each solution was measured 
with respect to all masses between 137 and 192 using an ElementXR (Thermo Fischer Scientific, 
Bremen, Germany) in triple detection mode (counting mode, analog mode and Faraday cup). The 
sample introduction consisted of a Twinnabar spray chamber and a Micromist nebulizer (both from 
GlassExpansion, Port Melbourne, Australia). The measurement data was corrected for dead time and 
blank subtracted. The ratios for each oxide, hydride and hydroxide was calculated. 
4.4.2 Sample dissolution 
CUP-2 was dissolved by microwave digestion (Mars5, CEM Corporation, Matthews, U.S). 0.2 g of the 
material was mixed with 9 mL concentrated HNO3 + 0.09 M HF and 1 mL of ultra-pure water (Milli-Q, 
Merck KGaA, Darmstadt, Germany) in a Teflon tube. The temperature was ramped to 180C during 20 
minutes and that temperature was held for 15 minutes. The samples were thereafter diluted to a 
concentration of approximately 10 mg U g-1. 
The reason for using lithium borate fusion for the REE-2 material was due to incomplete digestion 
when using the microwave oven. 1 g of the material was placed in a graphite crucible together with 3 
g of LiBO2 (Ultrapure, Claisse, Quebec, Canada). The sample was pre-oxidized for 2 h in 650C. 
Thereafter, the temperature was increased to 1050C and the sample was fused for 15 minutes. After 
cooling, the resulting glass bead was dissolved in 100 mL 1.4 M HNO3 while heating and stirring. After 
dissolution, 0.4 g of polyethylene glycol (PEG-2000, Alfa Aesar, Karlsruhe, Germany) was added to 
flocculate silica. The solution was evaporated to approximately 50 mL and left overnight to let the slow 
flocculation proceed. The solution was filtered through a OOM filter paper (Munktell, Alstrom 
Munksjö, Helsinki, Finland) and diluted in 1 M HNO3. Blanks were prepared in the same manner as the 
samples for each of the methods above. 
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4.4.3 Chemical separations 
An aliquot was taken from the dissolved reference materials and either diluted to 0.05 M HNO3 or 
evaporated to almost dryness and dissolved in 2 mL 0.05 M HNO3. For the yield determination, two 
samples were prepared for each replicate whereof one was spiked with a known amount of lanthanide 
standard solution. Due to the low amount of uranium in the REE-2 reference material, 1 mg of uranium 
was added to these samples to mimic a high uranium content. The in-house prepared 2 mL Ln resin 
columns (resin and columns both from Triskem International, Bruz, France) were conditioned with 1 
mL 0.05 M HNO3. Thereafter, the samples were added to the column. The samples tubes were rinsed 
with 2x1 ml 0.05 M HNO3 and the rinse solutions were also added to the columns. Next, La-Nd was 
eluted into 25 mL Teflon beakers using 6 mL 0.4 M HCl. The beakers were changed and Sm-Gd was 
eluted with 10 mL 0.75 mL HCl. The change of beakers was repeated and Tb-Lu was eluted using 20 ml 
10 M HNO3. All solutions were evaporated to near dryness and dissolved in 2% nitric acid. 
4.4.4 Measurements 
The unseparated samples as well as the separated samples were diluted to a concentration between 
6 pg g-1 and 2 ng g-1 using 2% HNO3. Indium, rhodium and rhenium was added as internal standard to 
a concentration of 1 ng g-1. The choice of internal standard element depended on lanthanide.  
The measurements were performed on an Element2 (Thermo Fischer Scientific, Bremen, Germany). 
The standard sample introduction consisted of a cyclonic Twister spray chamber and a 1 mL min-1 
concentric Conikal nebulizer (both from GlassExpansion, Port Melbourne, Australia). The desolvating 
sample introduction system consisted of a Cetac Aridus II and a 100 µL min-1 C-flow nebulizer (both 
from Teledyne Cetac Technologies, Omaha, Nebraska, US). The instrumental settings and 
measurement parameters can be found in Table 3. The instrument was tuned with a 1 ng g-1 cerium 
standard solution to minimize the cerium oxide formation rate and maximizing the sensitivity.  
Table 3 Instrumental settings for the two sample introduction systems measurement parameters. 
 Standard sample 
introduction 
Desolvating sample 
introduction 
 Twister spray chamber Aridus II 
Nebulizer Conikal C-flow PFA 
Forward power [W] 1250 1200 
Cool gas flow [L min-1] 16 16 
Auxiliary gas flow [L min-1] 0.7 0.7 
Nebulizer gas flow [L min-1] 1.1 0.9 
Ar Sweep gas [L min-1] N/A 3.2 
Nitrogen [mL min-1] N/A 10 
Resolution 300 
Mass window 5% 
Samples per peak 100 
Runs and passes 100 x 1 
Scan type E-scan 
Measured analyte isotopes 137Ba, 139La, 140Ce, 141Pr, 146Nd, 147Sm, 153Eu, 157Gd, 
159Tb, 163Dy, 165Ho, 167Er, 169Tm, 174Yb, 175Lu 
Measured internal standard isotopes 103Rh, 115In, 185Re 
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The quantification was performed with a calibration curve based on five points using standard 
solutions certified by mass. For the direct measurements, a multi-element solution containing all 
lanthanides (Sigma Aldrich, Buchs, Switzerland) was used. For the separated samples, three different 
certified standard solutions containing La-Nd, Sm-Gd and Tb-Lu, respectively (Spectrascan, Inorganic 
Ventures, Christiansburg, USA) were used. For quality assurance, a control sample consisting of a 
dilution of a certified standard solution of different origin than the calibration standard solution was 
used (CPAchem Ltd, Stara Zagora, Bulgaria). For the direct measurements, the control sample standard 
solution was purchased from Sigma Aldrich (Buchs, Switzerland) and for the separated samples, the 
standard solutions were purchased from CPAchem Ltd (Stara Zagora, Bulgaria). 
The dead time was evaluated according to Appelblad and Baxter [2000] using a Lu standard solution. 
All data reduction and calculations were performed off-line. The external calibrations, using weighted 
linear regression with the standard uncertainty in y as weight, were carried out according to Sayago 
and Asuero [2004] and the calculations as well as the measurement uncertainties were evaluated using 
a Monte Carlo method in the same manner as Ramebäck and Lindgren [2018] using Microsoft Excel. 
The measurement results were normalized with respect to Chondrite values, see Figure 10-11 and 13-
14 [Anders and Grevesse, 1989]. 
4.5 EXTERNAL CALIBRATION FOR TRACE ELEMENT ANALYSIS 
4.5.1 Sample preparation 
Three different certified reference materials (CRM) were chosen for the study: Periodic Table Mix 3 for 
ICP (Sigma Aldrich, Buchs, Switzerland), Spectrascan (Spectrascan, Inorganic Ventures, Christiansburg, 
USA) and CPAchem (CPAchem Ltd, Stara Zagora, Bulgaria). All reference materials were certified by 
mass and traceable to NIST. The certified uncertainty varied between 0.2% and 0.8% depending on 
analyte and supplier. One of the CRMs was used as a calibration standard and was diluted to 500 pg g-
1, 1000 pg g-1, 1500 pg g-1, 2000 pg g-1 and 2500 pg g-1. The other two CRMs were used as quality control 
samples and diluted to 100 pg g-1 and 1000 pg g-1. The dilutions were performed using in-house sub-
boiled nitric acid and ultra-pure water. All measurement samples contained 2% HNO3. 1 ng g-1 rhodium 
was added to each sample as internal standard. Blank samples were prepared together with the 
samples. The sample preparation was performed gravimetrically in order to reduce uncertainties 
compared to volumetric additions. However, uncertainty modelling was also done in order to compare 
volumetric and gravimetric additions from an uncertainty perspective. The analytical balance used in 
this work was a Mettler Toledo AX204 (Columbus, Ohio, US) with an uncertainty of 0.3 mg, k=2. 
4.5.2 Measurements 
The measurements were performed using an Element 2 (Thermo Scientific, Bremen, Germany) with a 
concentric nebulizer and a cyclonic spray chamber (both GlassExpansion, Melbourne, Australia). The 
conditions for the measurement setup can be found in Table 3. Also in this case, the instrument was 
tuned with a 1 ng g-1 cerium solution to maximize the signal of cerium while keeping the formation of 
CeO low. The magnitude of the CeO formation was 2.5% during all measurements. 
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4.5.3 Data evaluation 
All measurement raw data from calibration and quality control samples were extracted from the 
instrument software and evaluated offline. For each sample, the mean intensity and standard 
deviation of the mean were calculated from the 500 data points resulting from samples per peak and 
100 sweeps, for each isotope. The intensities were corrected for dead time and thereafter corrected 
for internal standard. The internal standard intensities were corrected for the added amount of 
internal standard according to Eq. 23 to improve the internal standard correction: 
𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐼𝑖,𝑗
𝐼𝐼𝑆,𝑖
𝑚𝐼𝑆,𝑖
∗
𝐼𝐼𝑆,𝑏𝑙𝑘
𝑚𝐼𝑆,𝑏𝑙𝑘
   (23) 
where Icorr,i,j is the intensity for isotope j in sample i corrected for internal standard, Ii,j is the dead-time 
corrected intensity of isotope j in sample i, IIS,i and IIS,blk are the dead-time corrected intensities of the 
internal standard in sample i and the blank sample and mIS,i and mIS,blk are the mass of the added 
internal standard in sample i and the blank sample, respectively. Calibration functions were calculated 
using two methods, OLS and WLS with the standard uncertainty in y as weight, see Eqs. 18-19 and Eqs. 
20-21, respectively. OLS was performed using the LINEST() function in Microsoft Excel 2016. In the OLS 
regression, additional regression statistics was retrieved and used as uncertainties. Using WLS, two 
different regressions were calculated using uncertainties from sample preparations performed 
gravimetrically as well as volumetrically to compare the differences in the results depending on choice 
of sample preparation. For each type of linear regression, the slope and intercept together with 
uncertainties of respective parameter were estimated. 
The calibration functions were used to calculate the detection limits according to Eq. 22 and to 
evaluate the concentrations of the quality control samples of the two CRMs here named Standard 
solution 1 and 2. The calculated concentrations were compared to the certified value using the zeta 
score (ζ) [ISO 13528:2015]: 
𝜁 =
𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑−𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
√𝑢2(𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑)−𝑢2(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
  (24) 
where cmeasured is the measured and calculated concentration and creference is the certified concentration 
and u(cmeasured) and u(creference) are their respective uncertainties. If |𝜁| ≤ 2  the measured value is 
consistent with the certified value within their respective uncertainties at a 95% confidence level. 
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 LOW-RESOLUTION GAMMA SPECTROMETRY FOR URANIUM CATEGORIZATION 
The fitted simulated response functions can be seen in Figure 4. It is obvious that the response of a 
very dense material such as uranium metal is very different from the response of a matrix containing 
water. This effect is seen in both the low as well as the high-energy region but is more prominent in 
the low energy region. The efficiency at 185.7 keV is approximately 40 times higher in the water matrix 
than in the uranium metal matrix. At 1001 keV, the difference is a factor 2.9. It is evident that the 
enrichment calculation of a water sample using a response function for a uranium metal matrix will 
overestimate the enrichment.  
 
Figure 4 Simulated response functions for the investigated matrices and shielding. 
The results of the categorizations done by the Identifinder can be found in Table 4. The table shows 
that UO2 is categorized as depleted uranium (DU) independent of the enrichment for the measured 
materials. On the other hand, the natural uranium (NU) water sample is categorized as low-enriched 
uranium (LEU). This implies that the response function used in the instrument is based on neither UO2 
nor a water matrix.  
Table 4 Results of the automatic instrument categorization. 
Uranium type Sample matrix Instrument categorization 
NU UO2 DU 
LEU UO2 DU 
DU UO2 DU 
NU Aqueous LEU 
 
The American National Standard Performance Criteria for Hand-Held Instruments for the Detection 
and Identification of Radionuclides states that an instrument should be able to identify radionuclides 
shielded by 5 mm of steel [ANSI N42.34-2006]. The results of the evaluated enrichment of all collected 
spectra using all response functions can be seen in Table 5. The results show that when the correct 
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response functions are used, i.e. the UO2 matrix response function for the UO2 samples and the water 
matrix response function for the aqueous sample, the enrichments agree with the materials.  
Table 5 Results from enrichment calculations using all simulated response functions, respectively. 
Sample Evaluated abundance of 235U, f235, with respective response function 
Uranium 
type 
Real 
matrix 
Water matrix 
Water matrix + 5 mm 
steel shielding 
Water matrix + 1 mm lead 
shielding 
UO2 matrix 
U metal 
matrix 
NU UO2 0.000681(51) 0.001052(79) 0.00348(26) 0.00882(66) 0.01041(78) 
LEU UO2 0.00166(20) 0.00257(30) 0.0085(10) 0.0213(25) 0.0251(30) 
DU UO2 0.0000449(63) 0.000069(10) 0.000230(32) 0.000587(82) 0.00069(10) 
NU Aqueous 0.0106(16) 0.0163(24) 0.0520(77) 0.123(18) 0.142(21) 
 
On the other hand, the instrument categorization results agree well with the results obtained using 
the water matrix + 5 mm steel shielding response function. This implies that the inherent response 
function of the instrument could be based on a water matrix with a 5 mm steel shielding, or something 
similar.  
The results show that it is evident that a correct categorization requires knowledge of the investigated 
material. If the categorization algorithm is dependent of the nature of the uranium material, which 
seems to be the case with this instrument, the outcome of the instrument is unreliable. It is therefore 
necessary for the user to take the acquired spectrum off-line and perform enrichment calculations 
using response functions based on the knowledge of the material to make sure that the categorization 
is accurate.  
To solve the problem with misclassifications, one option could be to provide the instrument with a 
range of response functions covering a variety of matrices. The user could then select the appropriate 
response function depending on the nature of the investigated material, when this is known. If the 
composition of the material is unknown, the evaluation could be performed with a number of response 
functions to provide a range of categories for initial decision-making. 
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5.2 SIGNATURES IN 241AM SOURCES 
The fitted response function using the 241Am peaks for Source 1 can be seen in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5 Efficiency response function of Source 1. The squares are the 241Am gamma lines used for the response function 
construction and the triangles are calculated responses for 233Pa peaks. 
5.2.1 Age 
The calculated ages at the time of measurement as well as the corresponding separation dates of all 
sources can be found in Table 6. The results show that Source 1 and Source 2, which are visually similar, 
have significantly different ages. The age of Source 4 was known, since the chemical separation and 
the electroplating was performed in 2001, which is in very good agreement with the calculated age. 
 
Table 6 Results for the age determination of the different sources. The presented ages are the ages at the time of 
measurement. The separation dates are derived from the calculated ages at the time of measurement.  
 Age [y] U [y] k=2 Separation date 
Source 1 31.4 2.0 1982-01-06 
Source 2 40.8 2.6 1972-07-18 
Source 3 43.9 3.6 1969-07-06 
Source 4 12.2 2.3 2001-06-25 
Source 5 21.5 6.9 1985-07-09 
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5.2.2 Impurities 
Spectra from Source 1-3 show peaks at gamma lines that do not originate from 241Am. Many of these 
peaks do not have a Gaussian shape. Instead, they seem to have two components, a narrow top and a 
broad base. The broad base is explained by Doppler broadening which occurs when an atom captures 
a particle and the formed nucleus de-excites while still in motion [Gilmore, 2008]. A comparison 
between a normal-shaped, Gaussian peak and a Doppler broadened peak can be seen in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 Left: Gaussian 1460 keV peak of 40K, right: a peak, which is Doppler, broadened at the base. 
This type of reactions (capture of alpha particles, neutrons or protons) requires that low-Z elements 
are present in the source to be more probable. Therefore, these peaks indicate that there are low-Z 
elements present in the sources and that nuclear reactions are taking place within the sources [Gehrke 
et al., 2003; Catz and Amiel, 1967]. Proposed reactions and their corresponding gamma peaks found 
in spectra from Source 1-3 can be seen in Figure 7. Source 4 and 5 are 241Am electroplated on stainless 
steel. Therefore, there are no signs of low-Z elements in these spectra. 
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1 DeVoigt et al. (1971)
2 Sharpey-Schafer et al. (1971)  
Figure 7 Identified gamma lines from nuclides other than 241Am and its progeny, and suggested reactions based on 
impurities. The nuclides with an asterisk are emitting gamma rays due to de-excitation. The reference to the gamma lines 
and corresponding half-lives are taken from the Nudat 2.6 database (2014) unless otherwise stated. 
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Another kind of impurities are radioactive elements. The spectra of Source 1 and 2 are compared in 
Figure 8. The figure shows that Source 1 have peaks of 239Np, while these are absent in Source 2. Since 
the half-life of 239Np is 2.356 days [DDEP, 2018], it is clear that 243Am is present in the source and that 
the daughter 239Np is in secular equilibrium with 243Am. Therefore, it is possible to calculate an 
243Am/241Am-activity ratio. For source 1 and 3 the ratio was 1.444(48)·10-6 and 2.09(11)·10-7, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Excerpt of spectra of source 1 and 2. 
 
This study shows that there are a number of potential signatures that can be used to distinguish 
different 241Am sources. The 239Np content alone was, in this case, enough to distinguish three different 
sources. Another potentially distinctive signature was the age. The ages of Source 1 and 2 were 
significantly different. This means that even though these two sources are visually very similar, they 
can be distinguished with one or two signatures obtained by gamma spectrometric measurements. It 
may therefore be possible to distinguish sources even though serial numbers are missing. This 
information could be added in an NNFL containing all indigenous 241Am-sources to be able to 
investigate found orphan sources in an efficient manner. 
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5.3 LANTHANIDE PATTERN MEASUREMENTS 
5.3.1 Oxide formation measurements 
The oxide formation fraction of each of the lanthanides can be seen in Figure 9. The results show that 
the highest amount of oxides can be found for the lightest of the lanthanides with a decreasing pattern. 
The lowest oxides are formed for europium and ytterbium. The level of the oxide formation vs element 
in Figure 9 agrees well with results published by Dulski [1994]. Since the oxide formation is highly 
dependent on instrumental conditions [Vaughan and Horlick, 1986; Longerich et al, 1987], the 
variation of the oxide formation may change on a daily basis. However, the relation between oxides 
remain the same. The fraction of formed hydroxides and hydrides were, if detectable, in the low ppm 
range. Therefore, the interferences coming from hydroxides and hydrides are considered negligible. 
 
 
Figure 9 Fraction of oxide formation of the elements in the lanthanide series. 
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5.3.2 Interfered measurements 
The results of the measurements of unseparated samples of REE-2 using the standard sample 
introduction system can be found in Figure 10. For most elements in the lanthanide series, the results 
correspond well with the certified values, but for gadolinium and terbium, the measurement results 
are overestimated. This is due to polyatomic interferences from the light lanthanides, where the oxides 
of praseodymium and neodymium, 141Pr16O+ and 143Nd16O+, end up in the same peak as 157Gd and 159Tb, 
respectively. The overestimation of these elements were in this case approximately 60% and 40%, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 10 Comparison of the lanthanide pattern for REE-2 between certified values and results from direct measurement 
using a standard sample introduction system. The uncertainty bars are, in some cases, smaller than the bullets. 
5.3.3 Interference-reduced measurements 
The resulting lanthanide pattern of REE-2 of the measurements performed with a desolvating sample 
introduction system and on separated samples, using a standard sample introduction system can be 
found in Figure 11 and 13, respectively. The results correspond very well with the certified values, i.e. 
no significant deviations were observed.  
 
Figure 11 Comparison of the lanthanide pattern for REE-2 between certified values and measured results using a desolvating 
sample introduction system. The uncertainty bars are, in some cases, smaller than the bullets. 
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The chemical separation method divides the lanthanides into three fractions. By examining Figure 2, 
the most effective separation method to remove the most prominent polyatomic interferences would 
be to separate the lanthanide series into two fractions: La-Eu and Gd-Lu. However, to separate 
gadolinium from europium in a single separation step using HDEHP has been proven difficult to 
accomplish [Nash and Jensen, 2000; Morais and Ciminelli, 1998; Morais and Ciminelli, 2007].  
A more easily achievable separation method that still solves the issue with interferences from light 
lanthanides from the heavy ones is to separate the series into three fractions rather than two: La-Nd, 
Sm-Gd and Tb-Lu. The method development was based on methods previously proposed by Pin and 
Zalduegui [1997] and Yang et al. [2010]. By increasing the acid concentration, the lanthanides will elute 
in groups. For the last elution, the acid was changed to nitric acid to avoid the elution of uranium, 
which will co-elute with the heavy lanthanides when high concentrations of hydrochloric acid is used 
[Shabana and Ruf, 1977; Kaminski and Nuñez, 2000].  
The impact of interferences onto the elements in the lanthanide series after the samples have been 
separated into three fractions can be seen in Figure 12. The figure shows that, compared to Figure 2 
most interferences are removed by the separation. It should be noted that the only element that still 
does not have any isotope that is free from oxide interferences is lutetium, where 175Lu is interfered 
by 159Tb16O. However, this should only be a problem if the amount of terbium is many orders higher 
than that of lutetium. 
 
 
Figure 12 Comparison of the lanthanide pattern for REE-2 between certified values and measured values using a standard 
sample introduction system after a chemical separation. The uncertainty bars are smaller than the bullets in some cases. 
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m/z Ba La Ce Pr Nd Sm Eu Gd Tb Dy Ho Er Tm Yb Lu 
130 0.11                             
131                               
132 0.1                             
133                               
134 2.42                             
135 6.59                             
136 7.85   0.19                         
137 11.23                             
138 71.7 0.089 0.25                         
139 
138BaH 99.911                           
140   
139LaH 88.45                         
141     
140CeH 100                       
142     11.11 
141PrH 27.2                     
143     
142CeH   12.2                     
144         23.8 3.1                   
145         8.3                     
146 
130BaO       17.2                     
147 
130BaOH       
146NdH 15                   
148 
132BaO       5.8 11.3                   
149 
132BaOH       
148NdH 13.8                   
150 
134BaO       5.6 7.4                   
151 
135BaO       
150NdH 150SmH 48                 
152 
136BaO   
136CeO     26.7 
151EuH 0.2               
153 
137BaO         
152SmH 52                 
154 
138BaO   
138CeO     22.7 
153EuH 2.18               
155 
138BaOH 139LaO       
154SmH   14.8               
156   
139LaOH 140CeO         20.47   0.056           
157     
140CeOH 141PrO       15.65               
158     
142CeO 141PrOH 142NdO     24.84   0.095           
159     
142CeOH   
143NdO     
158GdH 100             
160         
144NdO 144SmO   21.86 
159TbH 2.329           
161         
145NdO 144SmOH   
160GdH   18.889           
162         
146NdO         25.475   0.14       
163         
146NdOH 147SmO       24.896           
164         
148NdO 148SmO       28.26   1.6       
165         
148NdOH 149SmO       
164DyH 100         
166         
150NdO 150SmO         
165HoH 33.5       
167         
150NdOH 150SmOH 151EuO         22.87       
168           
152SmO 151EuOH 152GdO       26.98   0.12   
169           
152SmOH 153EuO         
168ErH 100     
170           
154SmO 153EuOH 154GdO       14.91 
169TmH 2.98   
171           
154SmOH   
155GdO       
170ErH   14.09   
172               
156GdO   
156DyO       21.69   
173               
157GdO   
164DyOH       16.1   
174               
158GdO   
158DyO       32.03   
175               
158GdOH 159TbO 164DyOH       
174YbH 97.4 
176               
160GdO 159TbOH 160DyO       13 2.6 
 
Figure 13 Isotopes of the lanthanides with abundances [Meija et al, 2016] and their most prominent hydride, oxide and 
hydroxide interferences in ICP-MS, based on water and nitric acid chemistry. The colour scheme corresponds to separating 
the lanthanides into three fractions: La-Nd, Sm-Gd and Tb-Lu. The green marked isotopes are not interfered or only slightly 
interfered and can be used for quantitative determination. The red marked isotopes should be avoided for quantitative 
measurements. The yellow marked isotopes may be used for determination but are not completely free from interferences. 
All oxides in the chart refer to 16O. 
In the direct measurements, the uranium concentration was approximately  10 µg g-1. This level of 
heavy matrix did not affect the measurements using the standard sample introduction to any extent. 
However, the measurements using the desolvating sample introduction suffered from an almost 50% 
signal suppression due to the high concentration of uranium in the samples. This could however, to 
some extent, be compensated by the higher sensitivity that can be achieved by the desolvating sample 
introduction system. 
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5.3.4 CUP-2 
The lanthanide patterns for all three types of measurements, based on the CUP-2 reference material 
can be seen in Figure 14. The pattern is similar to previously published results [Balboni et al, 2017]. In 
this case, all three methods provide similar results. This means that for this kind of material, it is 
possible to use a standard sample introduction system with unseparated samples and still obtain an 
unaltered lanthanide pattern. However, the amounts of lanthanides in the CUP-2 material are rather 
low which means that higher concentrations of uranium has to be used in order to have measurable 
amounts of lanthanides. Since too high concentrations of a heavy matrix such as a uranium matrix 
causes both signal instability and memory effects, a separation to remove the uranium may be 
necessary even though the polyatomic interferences are negligible.  
 
 
Figure 14 Comparison of the lanthanide pattern for CUP-2 between measurements using all three methods. The uncertainty 
bars are smaller than the bullets in some cases. 
5.3.5 Measurement uncertainties 
The lowest measurement uncertainties can be achieved with direct measurement using a standard 
sample introduction system. Using a desolvating sample introduction system would, in theory, result 
in just as low uncertainties, but the signal stability is, in general, lower for this kind of sample 
introduction, which increases the measurement uncertainty slightly. The highest uncertainty was 
found for the separated samples. This is due to the uncertainties in the yield determination. Even 
though a standard sample introduction system is used, the combined uncertainty is significantly 
higher. The measurement uncertainties for the separated samples were on average around 3% with a 
few exceptions where the combined uncertainty was higher. 
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5.4 EXTERNAL CALIBRATION FOR TRACE ELEMENT ANALYSIS 
5.4.1 OLS vs WLS 
The effect of an OLS compared to a WLS regression can be seen in Figure 15. On closer inspection, the 
calibration function based on OLS regression is strongly overestimating the intercept of the line. This, 
together with high uncertainty of the intercept, will cause the detection limit to be very high in the 
case of OLS. The WLS regression, on the other hand, provides a calibration function that corresponds 
well at concentrations close to zero. The OLS detection limit in the case of Figure 15 was 10 pg g-1 while 
the corresponding detection limit for WLS was 14 fg g-1.  
 
  
 
Figure 15 Left: Calibration lines based on calibration data on holmium. The blue dots are the data points used for the 
calibration, the dotted line is the OLS based on these data points. The orange line is the corresponding WLS regression. Right: 
The same calibration lines in the low concentration part of the calibration. 
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5.4.2 Quality control samples 
The results of the measurement of the 1 ng g-1 QC samples and the comparison to the certified value 
using WLS regression can be seen in Figure 16. The figure shows that the concentration of some of the 
elements in Standard solution 1 deviates from the certified values. If the zeta score is larger than 2, 
the difference between measured and certified value is not covered by their uncertainties on an 
approximate 95% confidence level. The measurement results of Standard solution 2, on the other 
hand, agreed well with the certified values. One possibility is that the difference between the CRM is 
a result of differing isotopic compositions in the solutions. Therefore, all masses between 137 and 176 
in one sample from each CRM was measured and compared. There were no significant differences in 
isotopic compositions between the materials. These results could imply that, for some elements, there 
is a difference in concentration between Standard solution 1 and the CRM used for calibration not 
covered by the uncertainty of the two solutions. Therefore, this discrepancy needs to be addressed. 
 
Figure 16 Measurement results and certified values of each element together with the calculated zeta score. The blue series 
correspond to Standard solution 1 and the orange series corresponds to Standard solution 2. The continuous lines are the 
measured values and the dashed lines are certified values. The bars corresponds to the calculated zeta scores. 
According to ISO Guide 33:2015, any discovered bias should primarily be reduced or eliminated, 
secondly corrected for and the additional uncertainty added to the uncertainty budget and thirdly, if 
these approaches are regarded as impossible to carry through, the bias should be included in the 
uncertainty budget [ISO 33:2015]. Since it is difficult to determine which of the solutions that has the 
correct concentration, the third approach, to include the bias in the uncertainty budget was chosen. 
Therefore, an extra input quantity, δ, was added to the model equation for the calculation of the 
concentration of isotope j in sample i, ci,j, of the measured sample where mj is the intercept and kj is 
the slope of the calibration function and Icorr,i,j is the intensity of isotope j in the sample i corrected for 
dead-time and internal standard: 
𝑐𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑗−𝑚𝑗
𝑘𝑗
+ 𝛿   (25) 
δ has value 0 and the uncertainty of δ, u(δ), was increased until the zeta score was 2. This approach 
ensures that the result of the measurement of the QC sample corresponds to the certified value within 
uncertainties at the 95% confidence level and has previously been applied on replicate samples by 
Kessel et al. [2008] in a similar fashion. This δ and its uncertainty would, in other cases, be added to 
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samples that are measured in the same measurement sequence. It should be noted that if the choice 
was made to use the same CRM for the calibration as for the QC sample, this inconsistency would not 
have been detected and the risk of reporting analytical results containing bias or underestimated 
uncertainties would be considerable. 
The initial uncertainties of the measurements varied between 0.7 and 1.5% depending on element. 
After some of the measurands had received an extra uncertainty the measurement uncertainty 
increased to about maximum 3%, see Figure 17. The, in most cases, low combined uncertainty is largely 
a result from performing the sample preparation gravimetrically. The results from volumetric sample 
preparation gives uncertainties around 3%. Most of the uncertainty in this case can be explained by 
the addition of internal standard and the uncertainty in the estimation of the slope. The uncertainty 
of the pipettes were evaluated according to ISO 8655-6 [2002]. For volumes less than 1 ml the 
combined uncertainty was evaluated to 0.8%, k=1 and 0.4% for volumes larger than 5 ml. Due to the 
relatively high measurement uncertainty, there was no need for the extra uncertainty, u(δ), for any 
element, at the 1 ng g-1 level for the volumetric samples. 
 
 
Figure 17 Relative uncertainties for the measured 1 ng g-1 control samples when an extra uncertainty has been added when 
necessary. The following data are evaluated using weighted linear regression: The triangles correspond to Standard solution 
1, the circles to Standard solution 2 both with dilutions performed gravimetrically, the squares to Standard solution 1 in the 
case where dilutions were performed volumetrically. The diamonds correspond to the control sample from Standard solution 
1 evaluated using OLS. 
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It can be noted that the measurement uncertainty of Standard solution 1 using either OLS or WLS 
results in practically the same uncertainties at the 1 ng g-1 level. This implicates that the OLS regression 
works rather well in this part of the calibration. At the 100 pg g-1 level, however, the measurement 
uncertainty is substantially higher for the results based on OLS, see Figure 18. This is mainly due to the 
large uncertainty in the intercept that follows from using OLS regression on heteroscedastic data 
[Ketkar and Bzik, 2000]. 
 
 
Figure 18 Relative uncertainties for the measured 100 pg g-1 control samples when an extra uncertainty has been added 
when necessary. The following data are evaluated using WLS: The triangles correspond to Standard solution 1, the circles to 
Standard solution 2 both with dilutions performed gravimetrically and the squares to Standard solution 1 in the case where 
dilutions were performed volumetrically. The diamonds correspond to the control sample from Standard solution 1 
evaluated using OLS. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This work has shown the development of a series of signatures that are useful in the field of nuclear 
forensics. The work also highlights some problems that may be encountered in measurements of 
nuclear forensic signatures. One of the primary goals in nuclear forensics is to achieve accurate and 
precise measurements. There should be no ambiguity in the obtained analysis results. Therefore, the 
method development in nuclear forensics strive to reduce measurement uncertainty and to 
understand measurement processes to the extent that the measurement uncertainties are fully 
understood and accounted for.  
Paper I highlights the difficulty of categorizing uranium automatically using low-resolution 
instruments. Even though a categorization carried out with such an instrument hardly would be the 
only measurement performed in a nuclear forensic investigation, the direction of the initial 
investigation may rely upon that measurement. The progress of the investigation could be impeded if 
the categorization would be incorrect. Therefore, it is important to be aware of the limitations of 
low-resolution measurements. 
Paper II illustrates a number of possible signatures that can be used to identify 241Am sources in 
cases where labels and serial numbers are destroyed or unreachable. Corresponding signatures 
should be possible to use in other types of sources with an alpha emitting nuclide. These signatures 
would be useful to populate an NNFL, since the combination of multiple signatures could single out 
or at least narrow down the identity of a source found out of regulatory control. 
The work in Paper III investigated the prospect of maximizing accuracy and precision in 
measurements of lanthanides for geolocation of uranium using ICP-MS.  Polyatomic interferences in 
measurements of the lanthanide series are well-known but have been neglected since the conclusion 
of geological origin is based on visual inspection of the chondrite normalized lanthanide pattern. If 
closer examinations need to be made, as often in the case of nuclear forensics, the interferences may 
start to affect conclusions drawn from the lanthanide measurement results. Since the oxide 
formation may vary on a daily basis, the impact of interfering species may also vary. This means that 
if two identical materials are measured on different occasions, the lanthanide measurements could 
indicate that the materials have different provenance. Therefore, by correcting for or avoiding the 
polyatomic interferences, the possibility to use the lanthanide series for comparison between 
materials in different parts of the nuclear fuel production, opens up.  
Paper IV highlights the intricacy of measuring trace elements using external calibration and mass 
spectrometry. Since trace elements can be expected to be very low in concentration in uranium 
materials, the importance of providing an accurate calibration over the whole calibration range 
cannot be emphasized enough. The study shows that, in order to perform measurements with high 
confidence, a number of parameters need to be considered. The choices that are made considering 
type of regression and how the sample preparation has been performed, are crucial for the quality of 
the measurement results and at the end on the decision making process where the measurement 
result is an important part. 
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8 ABBREVIATIONS 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
CRM Certified Reference Material 
DU Depleted uranium 
ESA Electrostatic Analyzer 
FTIR Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrometry 
GC-MS Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometry 
GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
HDEHP Di-(2-ethylhexyl)-phosphoric acid 
HEU Highly enriched uranium 
HPGe High Purity Germanium detector 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICP-MS Inductively Coupled Plasma - Mass Spectrometry 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ITDB Incident and Trafficking Data Base 
ITWG Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group 
LEU Low enriched uranium 
LREE Light rare earth elements 
MCNPX Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended 
NAA Neutron activation analysis 
NNFL National Nuclear Forensics Library 
NPT Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NU Natural uranium 
OLS Ordinary least squares regression 
RDD Radiological Dispersion Device 
SEM Scanning Electron Microscope 
SIMS Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SSAMS Single Stage Accelerator Mass Spectrometry 
TEM Transmission Electron Microscopy 
TIMS Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry 
UOC Uranium ore concentrate 
VGSL Virtual Gamma Spectroscopy Laboratory 
WLS Weighted least squares regression 
XRD X-ray Diffraction 
XRF X-ray Fluorescence 
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